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INTRODUCTION
Climate change is a global problem without a global legal solution.
Greenhouse gases (“GHGs”) accumulate in the atmosphere.
The
atmosphere encompasses the globe, so it is nearly impossible to trace GHG
emissions to their sources or to determine which sources cause a particular
harm. Moreover, it is difficult to allocate liability because the damage
occurs beyond the boundaries of any individual court’s jurisdiction. There
is no global institution to provide oversight, and traditional international
law methods, such as treaties, have produced unsatisfactory results. As a
result, injured parties increasingly turn to local courts. Local courts,
however, are limited by the scope of their judicial boundaries and must use
existing doctrine to address climate change. For example, courts cannot
adjudicate claims unless plaintiffs have standing to bring a case. In the
United States, this means that plaintiffs have to prove injury, causation, and
redressability.
Typically, local doctrines, including standing, were
designed to ensure that localized issues are ripe for adjudication in a
particular court, so they are not always adequate for or adaptable to global
problems like climate change. Nevertheless, courts must apply existing
statutes, principles, and doctrines to climate change claims.
As might be expected, courts struggle to apply standing doctrine to
this global problem. First, even if there is a colloquial injury,1 judges
disagree on how to assess that injury given its global nature. Second, given
the difficult, if not impossible, task of linking particular injuries to
particular emissions and the need for judicially manageable standards by
which to assess that link, plaintiffs struggle to establish causation. Third,
courts must be able to provide redress, but, in the context of climate
change, their power is limited to judicial review and statutory
interpretation. Since courts are not appropriate forums for setting emission
standards, they provide redress by requiring agencies to take action or by
holding agency decisions void.
An analysis of how courts apply each element of local standing
doctrine in the context of climate change demonstrates how local courts
address global problems. In many cases, the local doctrines cannot

1.

i.e., an injury in a practical rather than a legal sense.
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accommodate global problems, and, as a result, potential cases are barred
from judicial review. Yet, in other cases, local courts can adapt the
doctrinal requirements to address global problems, accommodating certain
claims and certain actors. When such adaptation is possible, a local court
can become part of the global solution.
Assessing the doctrinal bounds of local courts when it comes to global
problems like climate change also raises larger questions on the
functionality, legitimacy, and capacity of local courts. Existing doctrines
should ensure that, when courts address global problems, they are
functionally appropriate, legitimate, and capable of adjudicating those
global problems and becoming part of the solution.
Part I will explore the depths of climate change and what makes it a
global problem. Part II will use the doctrine of standing to determine the
circumstances under which local courts can address climate change. In this
analysis, isolating the components of standing—injury, causation, and
redressability—demonstrates the unique ways in which climate change
complicates standing and reveals how courts evaluate particular claims.
Part III will address whether local courts can and ought to participate in
solving a global problem like climate change. In this way, standing
doctrine will illuminate if, when, and how local courts address global
problems and participate in the global solution.
I. CLIMATE CHANGE AS A GLOBAL PROBLEM
A. How is Climate Change a Global Problem?
The climate change discussion centers on GHGs, which trap heat in
the atmosphere and regulate the global climate.2 While GHGs exist
naturally, human activities are adding increasing amounts of GHGs to the
atmosphere—carbon dioxide in particular—by burning fossil fuels3 and
clearing forests.4 Once in the atmosphere, GHGs work “like a blanket”: the
more GHGs, the thicker the blanket, and the warmer the planet.5
Consequently, an increase in GHG emissions leads to an increase in global
temperature. This increase significantly alters the global climate, often
causing extreme and unpredictable weather.6
The source of the
problematic emissions is not singular, it is impossible to disaggregate
2. Causes of Climate Change, WORLD WILDLIFE FUND, http://worldwildlife.org/threats/climatechange (last visited Dec. 25, 2012).
3. Such fossil fuels include coal, oil, and natural gas.
4. Causes of Climate Change, supra note 2.
5. Id.
6. Id.
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emissions because climate change only occurs after GHGs accumulate in
the atmosphere, and the harmful effects of climate change are felt
worldwide. Consequently, climate change is a global problem and any
solution must also be global.
One such solution seems to be lowering and regulating GHG
emissions. But without a single governing institution with the authority to
implement such limits on total global GHGs, the problem evades a simple
legal solution. The atmosphere is a global commons: an indivisible and
finite resource shared by all but not regulated by one omnipotent
institution.7 While seeking to maximize their own gain, individuals and
organizations emit increasing amounts of GHGs. For example, individuals
drive cars to accomplish daily activities and coal-mining companies mine,
transport, and use coal before refining it and selling it to customers for
profit. These emission-causing activities have utility for each individual or
organization. For each individual, there is a high positive component: the
benefit of or profit from those activities. But there is also a small negative
component: contribution of GHGs to the atmosphere. When adding the
component utilities of GHG emissions, the net result for each discrete
emitter is positive because, individually, the positive component outweighs
the negative component. Accordingly, each individual has the incentive to
continue to emit GHGs leading to misuse and overuse of the commons.
Cumulatively, increased GHG emissions cause climate change, which
results in climate change-related injuries. In this situation, the freedom of
the commons, or the lack of global GHG emission standards and limits,
leads to ruin. And, “[t]herein is the tragedy.”8 The destructive effects of
increased GHG concentration in the atmosphere render climate change a
global tragedy of the commons.
Moreover, climate change is a global problem because it is neither
international nor domestic; it concerns the world as a whole.9 Given that

7. See, e.g., Marvin S. Soroos, Preserving the Atmosphere as a Global Commons, ENVTL.
CHANGE & SECURITY PROJECT REP., Summer 2000, at 149, 149–50, available at
www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/Report6-9.pdf (discussing the atmosphere as a global commons
and the lack of overarching law to regulate GHG impact on the atmosphere); see also Daniel W.
Bromley & Jeffrey A. Cochrane, Understanding the Global Commons (Envtl. and Nat. Resources
Training Project (EPAT/MUCIA), Working Paper No. 13, 1994), available at
www.aae.wisc.edu/pubs/misc/docs/em13.pdf (noting that the atmosphere is part of the global
commons).
8. Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243, 1244 (1968), available at
http://www.sciencemag.org/site/feature/misc/webfeat/sotp/pdfs/162-3859-1243.pdf.
9. See Ralf Michaels, US Courts as World Courts 14 (Duke Univ. Sch. of Law, Working Paper,
2012) (“[W]orld events are events that concern the world as a whole; they are therefore more than just
international events.”).
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the 195 parties10 to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change11 “[a]cknowledg[e] that change in the Earth’s climate and its
adverse effects are a common concern of humankind,”12 there seems to be a
consensus that the problem is global. Attempting to categorize climate
change cases as either local or international, in which case the appropriate
actors would be, respectively, local or international, is futile because
“neither ‘domestic’ nor ‘international’ conveys fully the multiscalar
character of [climate change].”13 More importantly, this global problem
“transcends the relations between states and focuses also on nongovernmental actors and individuals,”14 inviting non-traditional actors to
participate in addressing the problem. The problem’s transcendence of
national boundaries and traditional international actors raises concerns
about how, where, and when to bring climate change claims. As an
inherently global problem, climate change defies solutions by local laws,
international laws, or conflict of laws frameworks.
Thus, climate change is a global problem not only because everyone is
a culprit but also because there is no institution to regulate GHG emissions,
allocate responsibility, and hold violators liable. A global agency or global
court with the explicit authority to implement a holistic solution does not
exist. Local actions to minimize destruction of finite resources by
regulating and limiting GHG emissions are helpful in theory, but individual
actions must always fail because one actor limiting GHGs does not
necessarily result in a net decrease in GHG emissions. Other actors may
continue to emit GHGs at harmful levels, thereby negating the mitigation
efforts of others. Furthermore, a single local actor does not have a
significant effect on a global problem because it is necessary to
cumulatively lower GHG emissions below a global threshold. To avert the
tragedy, solutions cannot merely be local; they must be global.
B. Non-existence of a Global Solution by Traditional International Actors
Unfortunately, thus far, coordinated international efforts by traditional
international actors have proven ineffective. States, the most traditional
10. First Steps to a Safer Future: Introducing the United Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change, UNITED NATIONS FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE, http://unfccc.int/
essential_background/convention/items/6036.php (last visited Dec. 25, 2012).
11. See infra Part I.B for a further discussion of this treaty.
12. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change pmbl., done May 9, 1992, 1771
U.N.T.S. 107.
13. Hari M. Osofsky, The Intersection of Scale, Science, and Law in Massachusetts v. EPA, in
ADJUDICATING CLIMATE CHANGE: STATE, NATIONAL, AND INTERNATIONAL APPROACHES 129, 141
(William C. G. Burns & Hari M. Osofsky eds., 2009).
14. Michaels, supra note 9, at 11.
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international actors, have used conventional treaties to coordinate
international efforts.15 The first of these treaties was the United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change (“UNFCCC”). The UNFCCC
entered into force in 1994 and, with 195 parties, currently has nearuniversal membership.16 The treaty begins by invoking the concern that
“human activities have been substantially increasing the atmospheric
concentrations of greenhouse gases, that these increases enhance the
natural greenhouse effect, and that this will result on average in an
additional warming of the Earth’s surface and atmosphere and may
adversely affect natural ecosystems and humankind.”17 In response to this
concern, the UNFCCC puts forth a global objective to mitigate climate
change: “stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere
at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the
climate system.”18 In its attempt to implement a coordinated solution, the
treaty sets out commitments to reduce emission levels and establishes
principles member nations ought to implement in their domestic policy.19
While the treaty is binding, its use of verbs like “promote” and
“cooperate” lends it a more symbolic character.20 For example, developed
nations commit to “adopt national policies and take corresponding
measures on the mitigation of climate change, by limiting . . .
anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gases and protecting and enhancing
[their] greenhouse gas sinks and reservoirs.”21 Committing to policies and
taking measures to limit emissions does not necessarily mean that GHG
emissions will drop below the threshold needed to mitigate climate change.
Likewise, the parties’ pledge to “[t]ake climate change considerations into
account, to the extent feasible, in their relevant social, economic and
environmental policies and actions”22 does not mean taking climate change
into account will be a primary concern. Additionally, the caveat “to the
extent feasible” is highly principled but does not establish clear regulations:

15. See Background on the UNFCCC: The International Response to Climate Change, UNITED
NATIONS FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE, http://unfccc.int/essential_background/
items/6031.php (last visited Dec. 25, 2012) (discussing the timeline of coordinated international
efforts).
16. First Steps to a Safer Future: Introducing The United Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change, supra note 10.
17. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, supra note 12.
18. Id. art. 2.
19. Id. art. 4.
20. See, e.g., id. (obligating all parties to “promote sustainable management, and promote and
cooperate in the conservation and enhancement, as appropriate, of sinks and reservoirs.”).
21. Id. art. 4, ¶ 2(a).
22. Id. art. 4, ¶ 1(f).
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the level of consideration is left to the judgment of each nation and the
chosen standard could be utilized to favor economic incentives in place of
environmental ones. As a result, this wording grants countries a great deal
of liberty to address climate change to the extent they see fit.
The initial emission reduction provisions of the UNFCCC proved
inadequate, and in 1997, the parties negotiated the Kyoto Protocol to the
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. The Kyoto
Protocol entered into force in 2005 and currently has 191 parties.23 Most
significantly, the Kyoto Protocol uses more exigent language. For instance,
Article 3 states:
The Parties included in Annex I shall, individually or jointly, ensure
that their aggregate anthropogenic carbon dioxide equivalent emissions
of the greenhouse gases listed in Annex A do not exceed their assigned
amounts, calculated pursuant to their quantified emission limitation and
reduction commitments inscribed in Annex B and in accordance with the
provisions of this Article, with a view to reducing their overall emissions
of such gases by at least 5 per cent below 1990 levels in the commitment
period 2008 to 2012.24

In principle, the move towards more stringent commitments is a
positive step because it suggests tighter regulation, which will hopefully
mitigate climate change. Moreover, the use of subsequent protocols, such
as the Kyoto Protocol, rather than the negotiation of a new treaty, is
theoretically useful in addressing collective action problems.25 Such
protocols allow the principles of the original treaty to stand firm while
details, such as emission standards and obligations, can be implemented
based on the progress made under existing protocols.
Although such treaty regimes are designed to address collective action
problems,26 this mechanism has not yet proved effective. Evidence

23. Making Those First Steps Count: An Introduction to the Kyoto Protocol, UNITED NATIONS
FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE, http://unfccc.int/essential_background/kyoto_
protocol/items/6034.php (lasted visited Dec. 25, 2012); Status of Ratification of the Kyoto Protocol,
UNITED NATIONS FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE, http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/
status_of_ratification/items/2613.php (last visited Jan. 31, 2013).
24. Kyoto Protocol to United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change art. 3, ¶ 1,
adopted Dec. 11, 1997, 2303 U.N.T.S. 161.
25. See Laurence R. Helfer, Exiting Treaties, 91 VA. L. REV. 1579, 1632 (2005) (“Protecting the
earth’s ozone layer and reducing global warming are classic collaboration problems.”).
26. See id. at 1632 n.137 (“In the ozone regime, iteration takes the form of a principal convention
and a series of later protocols and revisions. States use ratification of these tiered agreements as a
signal of their adherence to particular levels of commitment, thus promoting more durable cooperation
and higher levels of compliance.”).
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indicates that responses to climate change at the level of international
oversight have been and “will likely continue to be wholly inadequate to
confront the looming threat of climate change.”27 This lack of progress by
the traditional international actors using devices such as treaties and treaty
regimes has led to “growing despair by many actors, including
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), state and local governments in the
United States, and in many nations . . . .”28 Given this sentiment,
concerned parties look to other means to address climate change.
C. Turning to Local Actors: Local Governments and Local Courts
In conjunction with the limited success of traditional international
efforts, the role of local governments and local courts in global affairs is
growing.
Subnational and national governments are implementing
legislation pertaining to climate change and litigation is proceeding at the
subnational, national, and international levels. Not only do these multilevel
actions underscore the ineffectiveness of traditional international
mechanisms, they also demonstrate how climate change is a global problem
that lacks global oversight and cannot be solved from just one level of
regulation.29 Thus, local governments and local courts are becoming global
actors.30
On the subnational level, states, cities, and communities are
addressing global climate change through legislation and regulation.
District councils in New Zealand have tried to use their ability to control
land use to mitigate climate change.31 For example, in Genesis Power Ltd.
v Franklin District Council, the Franklin District Council rejected a wind
farm application due to potential adverse environmental impacts.32 The
Environment Court of New Zealand reversed the decision, but in its
analysis of the case, the court addressed climate change by weighing the
adverse impacts of climate change against the need for sustainable and

27. William C. G. Burns & Hari M. Osofsky, Overview: The Exigencies That Drive Potential
Causes of Action for Climate Change, in ADJUDICATING CLIMATE CHANGE: STATE, NATIONAL, AND
INTERNATIONAL APPROACHES, supra note 13, at 1, 1.
28. Id. at 18.
29. See id. at 20 (“[C]limate change is not a problem that can be addressed at only one level of
governance.”).
30. See Katherine Trisolini & Jonathan Zasloff, Cities, Land Use, and the Global Commons:
Genesis and the Urban Politics of Climate Change, in ADJUDICATING CLIMATE CHANGE: STATE,
NATIONAL, AND INTERNATIONAL APPROACHES, supra note 13, at 72, 85 (discussing the obsolescence
of the Westphalian system of nation-states and the increasing participation of local governments on an
international level in response to globalization).
31. See id. at 72–80 (discussing the Genesis Power case and the actions of local courts).
32. [2005] NZEnvC 341 at para [3] Whiting J for the Court.
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renewable energy.33 The use of this balancing test indicates an awareness
of and a willingness to address climate change and demonstrates that local
governments possess the power to do so. And, when taken cumulatively,
the decisions of local governments on land use can substantially affect
GHG emissions.34 Meanwhile, in the United States, states retain the
capacity to create and implement climate change legislation and
initiatives.35
For instance, Minnesota enacted an “environmental
externality reporting statute.”36 The statute requires utility companies to
conduct and provide estimates on environmental costs of power
generation.37 A commission considers these costs when they approve plans
and issue permits.38 Finally, an administrative law judge oversees
contested cases.39 The statute, however, lacks guidance on how to
implement the requirements, how to weigh environmental concerns against
other public concerns, and what kinds of environmental impacts are to be
considered.40
Additionally, it has been called a “relatively weak
regulation.”41 Much state regulation has been criticized as “weak or
symbolic regulation that lacks regulatory bite”; yet, the existence of such
regulations indicates an effort and a capacity to address a global problem
from the local level.42
On the national level, legislation requires national administrative
agencies to address climate change. For instance, in the United States,
Congress issued a mandate to the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
to set emission standards and to give Congress a “coordinated national
policy on global climate change.”43 This mandate acknowledges the global
nature of climate change and the urgent need for a solution. Similarly,

33. Trisolini & Zasloff, supra note 30, at 78.
34. See id. at 73 (suggesting that, cumulatively, local land decisions can have a substantial impact
on GHG emissions).
35. Stephanie Stern, State Action as Political Voice in Climate Change Policy: A Case Study of
the Minnesota Environmental Cost Valuation Regulation, in ADJUDICATING CLIMATE CHANGE: STATE,
NATIONAL, AND INTERNATIONAL APPROACHES, supra note 13, at 31, 46 (explaining that the states
retain power to create climate change legislation and regulations because the United States did not ratify
the Kyoto Protocol and the federal government was reluctant to enact national legislation in the early
2000s).
36. Id. at 32.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 34–35.
41. Id. at 32.
42. See id. at 46–47 (discussing the nuanced power of seemingly weak regulations).
43. Global Climate Protection Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-204, § 1103(b), 101 Stat. 1407,
1408–09.
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Australian environmental legislation calls for Commonwealth involvement
in the assessment and approval of an activity if a matter of national
environmental significance is involved.44 Specifically, the Environmental
Planning and Assessment Act (“EP&A Act”) requires the Director-General
of the Department of Planning, when conducting an environmental
assessment, to consider certain environmental principles, as defined in the
Protection of the Environment Administration Act.45 These principles
effectively require the Director-General to take the global nature of climate
change into account.46
Through the existence of these local (national and subnational)
statutes and regulations, local legislators and administrators take on a
global role. Since their laws address a global problem, actions taken in
compliance with these laws may have effects beyond their original
jurisdiction. The laws may have even been designed to have far-reaching
effects. For example, the goals of the U.S. policy on climate change
include “identify[ing] technologies and activities to limit mankind’s
adverse effect on the global climate by . . . stabilizing or reducing
atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases over the long term . . . .”47
The United States may not have control over the atmosphere, but it intends
to have an impact on the atmosphere through national policy. Likewise,
Australian legislation specifically envisions the regulation of agency
activities that are likely to have a significant environmental impact, even
beyond Australian jurisdiction.48
Subsequently, since the “traditional role accorded courts [is] to
interpret the law,”49 when local laws are related to climate change and
permit judicial review, domestic courts will interpret and enforce those
laws. Further, when appropriate plaintiffs bring viable claims, courts have
both the capacity and duty to rule on those claims. Courts have a vital role
to play in implementing and enforcing the rule of law50 and, because of this

44. Linda Pearson, Australia, in THE ROLE OF THE JUDICIARY IN ENVIRONMENTAL GLOBAL
GOVERNANCE: COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES 321, 325 (Louis J. Kotzé & Alexander R. Paterson eds.,
2009).
45. See Environmental Planning & Assessment Act 1979 (NSW) s 4 (defining “ecologically
sustainable development” according to its description in the Protection of the Environment
Administration Act).
46. See Gray v Minister for Planning [2006] NSWLEC 720 (Unreported, Pain J, Nov. 27, 2006)
¶¶ 101, 122, 134 (discussing the requirement to take ecologically sustainable development principles
into account, particularly the precautionary principle and the principle of intergenerational equity).
47. Global Climate Protection Act of 1987 § 1103(a)(3)(B).
48. See Pearson, supra note 44, at 326 (discussing the breadth of the EPBC Act).
49. Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 548 (1969).
50. See, e.g., United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 963 (1984) (Stevens, J., concurring in the
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role, they are uniquely capable of addressing climate change. A recent
statement from the South African Constitutional Court espouses the critical
role of courts to “entrench and uphold . . . current endeavors to achieve
sustainable environmental governance.”51 Moreover, institutions involved
in “the judicial process at the national, regional and global levels[] are
crucial partners for promoting compliance with, and the implementation
and enforcement of, international and national environmental law.”52 If
local courts can achieve this result, then they can truly address climate
change as a global problem. And, since traditional international efforts are
“not advancing,” parties are increasingly turning to litigation in local
courts.53 When local courts address this global problem, they become
courts not for their traditional jurisdiction but for the global population and
for the globe itself.54
II. STANDING: ACCOMMODATING AND IMPEDING CLIMATE
CHANGE LITIGATION
A. Standing Doctrine: A Threshold Issue for Adjudication
No matter how important the underlying problem of climate change
may be, local courts cannot rule on the substantive aspects of claims if they
do not have the jurisdictional authority to hear the case.55 Within legal
systems, courts have principles and doctrines at their disposal to determine
whether a particular plaintiff has a justiciable claim. These doctrines serve
as procedural hurdles, separating those claims suited for adjudication by
courts from those that are not. In the United States, for instance, Article III
of the Constitution limits the jurisdiction of federal courts to cases and
controversies in which the court can address “questions presented in an
adversary context and in a form historically viewed as capable of resolution
through the judicial process.”56 The claims that fulfill this Constitutional

judgment) (explaining how the “Court’s broad holding will serve the public interest in enforcing
obedience to the rule of law”).
51. Louis J. Kotzé & Alexander Paterson, Preface to THE ROLE OF THE JUDICIARY IN
ENVIRONMENTAL GLOBAL GOVERNANCE: COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES, supra note 44, at 23.
52. Id. at 24.
53. Brian J. Preston, Climate Change Litigation: A Conspectus, 5 CARBON & CLIMATE L. REV. 3
(2011) (suggesting that litigation is an attractive alternative path).
54. See Michaels, supra note 9, at 16 (“Here, a world court is court for the world”).
55. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 559–60 (1992) (discussing how the
jurisdiction of the judiciary is limited to cases and controversies under the separation of powers doctrine
and how standing doctrine identifies those cases that are appropriate for judicial review).
56. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 516 (2007) (quoting Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 95
(1968)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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constraint—those that involve suitable parties with appropriate timing,
justiciable issues, and legal requests—are deemed to have judicial
standing.57 Similarly, in Australia, to bring a suit, it is necessary to have
standing, which “depends on the identity of the person [bringing the claim]
and the nature of the proceedings.”58 Accordingly, standing is one of the
most fundamental components of any climate change litigation.59
In the U.S., under Article III standing doctrine, a plaintiff seeking
federal jurisdiction has the burden of establishing: (1) concrete and
particularized injury to a protected interest, (2) causation, meaning the
injury can be traced to the actions of the defendant, and (3) redressability,
such that the remedy sought from the court would mitigate, alleviate,
remedy, or repair the injury.60 While the “harms . . . are serious and well
recognized,”61 the nature of climate change makes meeting these criteria
and thus proving Article III standing difficult for plaintiffs.
This global problem affects the global population and climate, but
specific plaintiffs and locations tend to incur a disproportionate amount of
the harm. For instance, coastal areas are particularly affected because
warmer temperatures cause ice to melt, which causes coastal lands to
disappear due to rising water levels. 62 Additionally, the increased intensity
of storm surges threatens coastal areas with accelerated erosion or
destruction.63 In the Alaskan village of Kivalina, for example, melting ice,
coastal erosion, and storm surges caused so much harm that the town
brought a suit against ExxonMobil and other oil, energy, and utility
companies, claiming that the companies’ large volume of GHG emissions
caused these climate change injuries.64 In another case, the state of
Massachusetts brought a claim against the EPA, invoking the erosion of
Massachusetts’s coastal lands as an injury caused by the EPA’s failure to
57. See id. at 505 (stating the requirement that a petitioner have standing in order to invoke the
jurisdiction of the court under Article III).
58. Brian J Preston, Chief Judge, Land & Env’t Court of N.S.W., Austl., Paper Presented to the
Joint Seminar on Legality of Administrative Behaviours and Types of Adjudication: Standing to Sue at
Common Law in Australia 2 (Apr. 11, 2006), available at http://www.lec.lawlink.nsw.gov.au/
agdbasev7wr/_assets/lec/m420301l721754/preston_standing%20to%20sue%20at%20common%20law
%20in%20australia.pdf.
59. See Native Vill. of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 663 F. Supp. 2d 863, 877 (N.D. Cal. 2009)
(citing Lujan, 504 U.S. at 559–60 (1992)) (discussing the need to fulfill standing requirements).
60. Id. (quoting Sprint Commc’n Co., L.P. v. APCC Servs., Inc., 554 U.S. 269, 273 (2008)).
61. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. at 521.
62. Coastal Areas, Climate Change, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, http://www.epa.gov/
climatechange/impacts-adaptation/coasts.html (last visited June 14, 2012).
63. Id.
64. See 663 F. Supp. 2d 863 (providing an example of climate change litigation involving a
private defendant).
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implement emission standards.65 These cases demonstrate that injured
parties are going to court and seeking to legally link their climate change
injuries to the increased GHG emissions of certain defendants or to the
failure of agencies to implement required regulatory responses to climate
change.
But successfully proving injury, linking that injury to a particular
cause, and then proving that the court can provide redress is no small task.
Given the way climate change occurs, many claims will not meet or not fit
standing requirements. While standing criteria is not the same in all
countries, using the U.S. requirements as a model enables a comparison to
similar doctrinal hurdles in other jurisdictions and demonstrates how local
courts address global problems.
B. Components of Standing
1. Injury
The first component of standing is injury. In the United States, to
prove injury, plaintiffs must demonstrate “a concrete and particularized
injury that is either actual or imminent.”66 This standard indicates that (1)
the case is ripe for adjudication because the injury has happened or will
happen in the near future if the court does not act and (2) the plaintiffs have
been harmed or their rights have been violated. Similarly, in Australia,
plaintiffs must differentiate themselves from the greater public.67 In the
case of climate change, even if there is a colloquial injury, such as
uncharacteristically intense erosion, judges have disagreed on how to
assess climate change injuries under standing doctrine.
a. Injury as Defined by Common Law or Statutory Language
In Massachusetts v. EPA, the State of Massachusetts, joined by other
state and local governments and environmental organizations, challenged
the EPA’s refusal to regulate GHG emissions under the Clean Air Act.68
The Clean Air Act requires the EPA to “prescribe . . . standards applicable
to the emission of any air pollutant . . . [which] cause[s], or contribute[s] to,
air pollution . . . anticipated to endanger public health . . . .”69 Thus, the
U.S. Supreme Court faced a statutory interpretation question about whether

65.
agency).
66.
67.
68.
69.

See 549 U.S. 497 (providing an example of a climate change case involving a regulatory
Id. at 517.
Preston, supra note 58, at 11.
549 U.S. at 505.
Id. at 528 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1) (2006)).
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the EPA had the authority under the Clean Air Act to set standards on
emissions and, if so, whether the EPA was required to set such standards.70
If it resolved that such a requirement existed, the Court had to determine
whether Massachusetts’ injuries were caused by EPA inaction in the face of
climate change.
First, the Court had to decide whether Massachusetts’ alleged injury
met the criteria of U.S. standing doctrine. In the circuit court opinion for
Massachusetts v. EPA, Judge Tatel, dissenting, felt that the substantial
probability that rising sea levels would “lead to serious loss of coastal
property” qualified as particularized injury.71 Meanwhile, Judge Sentelle,
concurring in part and dissenting in part, believed that while the plaintiffs
had alleged global warming harms humanity as a whole, they could not
allege particularized injuries to themselves.72 The EPA put forth a similar
argument before the Supreme Court, asserting that the way in which GHG
emissions cause widespread harm creates an “insuperable jurisdictional
obstacle” because it is impossible to assert personal injury.73
Eventually, the Supreme Court had the final word. The Court noted
the globally detrimental effects of climate change74 but reasoned that, to
meet the injury requirement, plaintiffs who are suffering from the harmful
effects of climate change must still establish injury “in a concrete and
personal way.”75 Given that climate change causes widespread harm,
however, proving concrete and particular injury ends up being a potential
barrier to adjudication. The Court declared climate change risks, such as
erosion from rising sea levels around the globe, are “widely shared.”76 But,
relying on prior applications of standing doctrine, it held Massachusetts’s
injury and its interests in alleviating such injury through litigation77 were
not minimized simply because climate change harms are widely shared.
Looking to Federal Election Commission v. Akins, the Court declared,
“where a harm is concrete, though widely shared, the Court has found
‘injury in fact.’”78
70. Id. at 516 (“The parties’ dispute turns on the proper construction of a congressional statute.”).
71. Id. at 515 (citing 415 F.3d 50, 65–66 (D.C. Cir. 2005), rev’d, 549 U.S. 497 (2007)).
72. Id. at 514–15.
73. Id. at 517.
74. Id. at 521.
75. Id. at 517 (quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 581 (1992) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring)) (“While it does not matter how many persons have been injured by the challenged action,
the party bringing suit must show that the action injures him in a concrete and personal way.” (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
76. Id. at 522 (quoting FEC v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 24 (1998)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
77. Id.
78. Id. (quoting 524 U.S. 11, 24 (1998)).
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Furthermore, the Supreme Court distinguished the global nature of
climate change from particular injuries resulting from climate change. The
specific injury in Massachusetts v. EPA resulted from the rising sea levels
eroding and “swallow[ing]” the Massachusetts coast.79
Since
Massachusetts “owns a substantial portion of coastal property,” it had a
particularized and personal injury in its “capacity as a landowner.”80
Specifically, Massachusetts stood to lose an asset (its lands) and incur costs
if climate change erosion continued unmitigated by EPA regulations. As
evidence, a Massachusetts official reasoned that “[i]f sea levels continue to
rise as predicted . . . a significant fraction of coastal property will be ‘either
permanently lost through inundation or temporarily lost through periodic
storm surge and flooding events.’”81 The petitioners also alleged that
remediation costs “could run well into the hundreds of millions of
dollars.”82 Given that erosion and rising sea levels would undisputedly lead
to the loss of Massachusetts’s sovereign territory, the State successfully
proved concrete, particularized, imminent injury.83 Yet, the subsequent
components of the Court’s reasoning emphasized the sovereign nature of
Massachusetts’s claim, suggesting mere landownership is not sufficient.84
In comparison, in Australia, what constitutes an injury is significantly
more expansive, especially under key pieces of environmental legislation.
For example, the Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation
Act of 1999 (the EPBC Act) requires “Commonwealth involvement in
assessment and approval of an activity” involving a matter of national
environmental significance85 or of activities that will likely have a
significant environmental impact “inside or outside Australian
jurisdiction.”86 Given the broad standing provision for plaintiffs,87 the
emphasis of the injury inquiry is on the environment. Thus, when bringing
a claim based on improper environmental assessment under the EPBC
Act,88 plaintiffs must show that emissions from proposed activities would

79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 523.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 521.
84. See infra Part I.B.1.b for a further discussion on this point.
85. Pearson, supra note 44, at 325.
86. Id. at 326.
87. See Preston, supra note 58, at 48 (discussing how the open standing provisions in much of the
environmental legislation of New South Wales allow any person to bring a claim to remedy a breach of
statute).
88. Such a failure may involve the decision-maker improperly conducting the assessment and
thus allowing the defendant to perform an activity that threatens protected environmental matters.
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directly or indirectly affect a protected area or matter or identify the extent
to which emissions would aggravate the climate change problem.89 Despite
the difference in focus, the EPBC Act evidentiary threshold functions
similarly to the U.S. requirement of a concrete and particularized injury to
a protected interest. The EPBC Act is just one example of planning
legislation that requires decision-makers to conduct an assessment of
environmental impacts.90
Both U.S. and Australian injury requirements seek to establish that
some particular harm has occurred as a result of the defendant’s actions.
The U.S. requirement places more emphasis on linking the plaintiff and the
defendant to the injury, whereas the focus under the EPBC Act is on
environmental injury. Additionally, the Australian formulation under the
EPBC Act is more accommodating because it allows for either (1)
particularized injury to a specific locality or plaintiff through direct or
indirect means or (2) proof of aggravation of a global problem. The
doctrinal focus on harmful impacts to protected areas or on the global
problem shifts the inquiry away from the claimant and towards the
environment. Furthermore, allowing courts to rule on environmental
impacts outside Australian boundaries drastically expands the scope of the
legislation and the court’s jurisdiction. As a result, Australian courts can
use environmental legislation to become global actors, assuming
jurisdiction over global injuries and global issues. In contrast, in the
United States, the problem may be global, but the injury still needs to be
particularized to a suitable plaintiff. Substantially freed from finding the
appropriate plaintiff to bring the claim and able to consider direct and
indirect impacts, EPBC doctrine potentially enables the Australian courts to
recognize a greater array of injuries than can their American counterparts.
Still, the application of Australian doctrine to climate change is not
always successful. In Wildlife Preservation Society of Queensland
Proserpine/Whitsunday Branch Inc. v Minister for the Environment &
Heritage (Wildlife Whitsunday), the plaintiffs91 sought review of decisions
under the EPBC Act regarding development of a new coal mine known as

89. Lesley K. McAllister, Litigating Climate Change at the Coal Mine, in ADJUDICATING
CLIMATE CHANGE: STATE, NATIONAL, AND INTERNATIONAL APPROACHES, supra note 13, at 48, 58.
90. Pearson, supra note 44, at 325. For a list of planning legislation incorporating environmental
impact assessments, see also id.,at 325 n.18.
91. While the text of the case uses “applicant,” the terms “applicant” and “plaintiff” are
interchangeable, so the term “plaintiff” will be used here for the sake of consistency with the U.S. cases.
See Roles in Court, COURTS & TRIBUNALS VICTORIA, http://www.courts.vic.gov.au/courts-tribunals/
going-court/roles-court/ (last visited Jan. 16, 2014) (stating that the plaintiff, complainant, or applicant
is “the person who initiates the case in a non-criminal (civil) matter”).
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the Isaac Plains project.92 Since the key question under the EPBC Act is
whether “an action has, will have or is likely to have a significant impact
on a matter protected by the Act,”93 the decision-maker, and ultimately the
court in its review of the decision-maker’s assessment, had to consider the
potential environmental effects of the proposed coal mine. In its opinion,
the court took the potential direct and indirect impacts of the mine into
account but ultimately held that the factual circumstances and a lack of
concrete evidence required dismissal of the case.94 The court was simply
not convinced that “indirect impact” envisioned the “burning of coal at
some unidentified place in the world, the production of greenhouse gases
from such combustion, its contribution toward global warming and the
impact of global warming upon a protected matter.”95 As such, even
though it is possible to measure the quantity of greenhouse gases a
particular project would produce,96 the court did not accept that quantity of
GHG emissions qualified as adverse environmental impact on a protected
matter. The cumulative nature of climate change did not fit traditional
notions of impact, and the court refused to allow the doctrine to expand to
accommodate climate change.
Additionally, the court concluded that GHG emissions of a single
project do not cause “any particular local environmental impact.”97 The
plaintiff focused on how GHG emissions lead to climate change but “paid
little or no attention to the actual effect on an identified protected matter.”98
Since the standard under the EPBC Act is “significant impact on a
protected matter,”99 failing to show such injury proved fatal to the
plaintiffs’ case.100 This part of the court’s ruling is similar to the U.S.
requirement of a particularized injury. Yet, since many areas are protected,
evidence focusing on harm to one of those areas might have helped the
plaintiff’s case. Moreover, the injury to that protected matter can be
indirect rather than concrete and particularized.

92. (2006) 232 ALR 510, ¶ 9.
93. Chris McGrath, Federal Court Case Challenges Greenhouse Gas Emissions from Coal
Mines, Wildlife Whitsunday Case, ENVTL. L. PUBLISHING 1, 1 (2006), available at http://www.envlaw.
com.au/whitsunday19.pdf.
94. See 232 ALR, ¶¶ 72–73 (discussing the direct and indirect impacts of the mine and
summarizing the circumstances for dismissal).
95. Id. ¶ 72.
96. McAllister, supra note 89, at 66.
97. Id. at 66–67.
98. 232 ALR, ¶ 40.
99. Id. ¶ 51.
100. See id. ¶ 44 (“There was no significant impact for the purposes of Part 3. The applicant must
fail on each of its first two grounds.”).
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Thus, in Australian courts as well as in U.S. courts, the global nature
of climate change can be a major hurdle to proving injury. Australian
direct and indirect impacts doctrine appears more accommodating than the
U.S. particularized injury requirement, but Wildlife Whitsunday
demonstrates the limits on the judiciary to apply law as enacted.101 Courts
may interpret legislation, at times expanding or accommodating new,
potentially global, problems, but ultimately courts are and ought to be
confined by how the law is written and by established doctrines. For
example, the court in Wildlife Whitsunday did not think the indirect impact
doctrine could correctly be applied to GHG emissions from coal mines.102
But, from the cases cited above, it appears the existence of a viable injury
depends on how the plaintiffs and judges characterize climate change and
on the relationship of the particular plaintiffs or environmental impacts to
this global problem. These limitations suggest that courts may not be able
to adjudicate certain cases.
b. Injury Based on Statutory and Procedural Rights
In Gray v Minister for Planning, the Land and Environment Court of
New South Wales103 considered whether an assessment by the DirectorGeneral of the Department of Planning regarding a proposal to build a large
coal mine, known as the Anvil Hill project, was void under the EP&A
Act.104 The plaintiff claimed the Director-General had to consider the
impact that burning coal would have on GHG levels and to take the
ecologically sustainable development principles (ESD principles)105 into
account in his environmental impact assessment.106
In that case, the purported injury was related to the Director-General’s
failure to appropriately consider those environmental impacts. Under the
Act, an “affected person”107 can obtain judicial relief if “he can show that
the authority has misdirected itself in law or that it has failed to consider

101. THE ROLE OF THE JUDICIARY IN ENVIRONMENTAL GLOBAL GOVERNANCE: COMPARATIVE
PERSPECTIVES, supra note 44, at 344.
102. McGrath, supra note 93, at 2.
103. The Land and Environment Court is a special environment court composed of judges with
relevant qualifications and experiences. Generally, the court engages in merits review and judicial
review of decisions. Pearson, supra note 44, at 332–33.
104. [2006] NSWLEC 720 (Unreported, Pain J, Nov. 27, 2006), ¶ 1.
105. The ESD principles are the precautionary principle; intergenerational equity; conservation of
biological diversity and ecological integrity; and improved valuation, pricing, and incentive
mechanisms. Pearson, supra note 44, at 327.
106. [2006] NSWLEC 720, ¶ 35–45.
107. Since the court did not address this component of standing, this paper will not analyze the
notion of an “affected person.”
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matters that it was required to consider or has taken irrelevant matters into
account.”108 This standard indicates that the court, in conducting judicial
review of decision-making, is limited to issues of law. It could conclude
the Director-General failed to perform his assessment in a manner required
by law. Here, the court carefully examined the environmental assessment
requirements and concluded the Director-General had failed to adequately
consider direct and indirect impacts and had failed to take ESD principles
into account.109 As a result, his assessment was void.110 Thus, injury under
the EP&A Act is not literal; it is the violation of a legal requirement that
will lead to environmental harms that the statute is supposed to prevent.
Such statues are critical in standing analysis because they enable the
plaintiffs to ask the court to engage in judicial review of an agency decision
and its purported deficiencies.
Similarly, in the United States, statutes can create a procedural right,
and violations of a procedural right are accorded special treatment under
standing doctrine. If Congress grants a litigant “a procedural right to
protect his concrete interests,”111 then the litigant can invoke that right and
achieve standing “without meeting all the normal standards for
redressability and immediacy.”112 Effectively, Congress has predetermined
that certain individuals have the right to bring certain claims to courts and
has also authorized courts to hear such claims. Thus, raising a procedural
violation enables plaintiffs to more easily fulfill standing requirements,
especially injury, because plaintiffs only have to show that (1) they have
already been granted the procedural right to protect their interests and (2)
there is some threat to a concrete interest.113 Moreover, only one of the
litigants needs to have such standing to obtain review by the courts,114
allowing litigants with a procedural right to unite with other concerned,
affected, and interested parties.
For example, in Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Watson, the plaintiffs
alleged that emissions from projects supported by the Overseas Private
Investment Corporation (OPIC)115 and the Export-Import Bank of the
108. [2006] NSWLEC 720, ¶ 77.
109. Id. ¶¶ 96–100, 143.
110. Id. ¶ 152.
111. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 517 (2007) (quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife,
504 U.S. 555, 572 n.7 (1992)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
112. Id.
113. Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Watson, No. C 02-4106 JSW, 2005 WL 2035596, at *2 (N.D.
Cal. Aug. 23, 2005) (quoting Douglas Cnty. v. Babbitt, 48 F.3d 1495, 1500 (9th Cir. 1995)).
114. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. at 517.
115. OPIC is an independent government development finance institution. It offers political risk
insurance, loans, and loan guarantees for projects in developing countries. Watson, 2005 WL 2035596,
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United States (Ex-Im)116 contributed to climate change without complying
with requirements set forth in the National Environmental Policy Act of
1969 (“NEPA”)117 and the Administrative Procedure Act.118 They claimed
that emissions from these projects caused adverse environmental impacts
that resulted in injury to members of the organization nationwide.119 Their
evidence demonstrated that (1) the aforementioned projects were directly or
indirectly responsible for eight percent of the world’s annual emissions; (2)
continued increases in GHG emissions would increase global warming,
causing widespread environmental impacts; and (3) these impacts “have
and will effect [sic] areas used and owned by Plaintiffs.”120 In response,
the court held that the plaintiffs had an injury based on a procedural right
because their evidence was “sufficient to demonstrate it is reasonably
probable that emissions from projects supported by OPIC and Ex-Im
support projects [sic] will threaten Plaintiffs’ concrete interests.”121
Similarly, in Massachusetts v. EPA, the plaintiffs brought a claim
challenging the EPA’s denial of the plaintiff’s rulemaking petition, which
urged the EPA to fulfill its mandate to set emission standards.122 The
plaintiffs had submitted the rulemaking petition because Congress had
ordered the EPA to prescribe applicable standards for emissions under 42
U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1).123 The plaintiffs then filed suit in court because
Congress had also provided the states a procedural “right to challenge the
rejection of its rulemaking petition as arbitrary and capricious” under 42
U.S.C. § 7607(b)(1).124 After holding that Massachusetts had suffered an
injury,125 the Court analyzed Massachusetts’s claim with regard to its
procedural right to bring a claim as a state.
While Congress had not provided a private right of action, it had
granted states a procedural right. Furthermore, “states are not normal

at *1; Who We Are, OVERSEAS PRIVATE INV. CORP., http://www.opic.gov/who-we-are/overview (last
visited Jan. 2, 2013).
116. Ex-Im is the official export credit agency of the United States and provides financing support
for U.S. exports into international markets. About Us, EXP.-IMP. BANK OF THE U.S., http://www.exim.
gov/about/ (last visited Jan. 2, 2013).
117. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321–4335 (2012).
118. 5 U.S.C. §§ 701–706 (2012); Watson, 2005 WL 2035596, at *1.
119. 2005 WL 2035596, at *1.
120. Id. at *3.
121. Id.
122. 549 U.S. 497, 519–20 (2007).
123. Id.
124. Id. at 520.
125. See supra Part II.B.1.a.
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litigants for the purpose of invoking federal jurisdiction.”126 Due to the
quasi-sovereign status of states, a state has “an interest independent of and
behind the titles of its citizens, in all the earth and air within its domain.”127
This interest means a state has standing to sue parens patriae if “the injury
is one that the state, if it could, would likely attempt to address through its
sovereign lawmaking powers.”128 Since the EPA refusal to regulate GHG
emissions had caused actual and imminent harm to Massachusetts and
since Massachusetts naturally has a desire to preserve its territory for its
citizens, the State had suffered an injury and had standing to sue parens
patriae.129
Moreover, the Court emphasized that Congress had “authorized this
type of challenge to EPA action,”130 giving courts the legitimacy and
capacity to become involved. Thus, while the Court was a local actor
because it was interpreting a federal mandate requiring the EPA to set
emission standards, it was also a global actor because the mandate
envisions a response to a global problem. Theoretically, such emission
standards can actually decrease net emissions, thereby mitigating the risk of
harm to the atmosphere, the environment, and the human population.
c. Conclusions on Injury
These cases suggest that procedural rights expand the inherent ability
of courts to adjudicate a dispute. In the United States, procedural rights
make it more likely that a plaintiff will have standing because once a
plaintiff establishes injury based on a procedural violation, some
uncertainty about causation and redressability is acceptable.131 If, however,
there is no procedural right, then a plaintiff must show a particularized and
personal injury and then proceed to prove causation and redressability
under traditional standards. Consequently, if the procedural right relates to
climate change, then it is likely that the local court can function as a global
actor addressing a global problem. In some cases, the identity of the
plaintiff makes a difference. For example, the Court’s emphasis on
Massachusetts’s ability to sue parens patriae based on quasi-sovereign
status suggests that this was an essential component of Massachusetts’s

126. 549 U.S. at 518.
127. Id. at 518–19.
128. Id. at 519 (quoting Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico ex rel. Bares, 458 U.S. 592,
607 (1982)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
129. Id. at 521.
130. Id. at 516 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b)(1) (2006)).
131. Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Watson, No. C 02-4106 JSW, 2005 WL 2035596, at *2 (N.D.
Cal. Aug. 23, 2005) (citing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 572 n.7 (1992)).
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ability to prove standing.
While the plaintiff’s identity may be critical in U.S. courts, Australian
courts, for the most part, do not focus on the plaintiff. Instead, they focus
on the injury itself. This difference is due in part to the standing
requirements in Australian legislation. For instance, the EPBC Act allows
“an ‘interested person’ to initiate proceedings for an injunction to enforce
the act.”132 Given the breadth of this standard, courts are prone to skip a
discussion of the plaintiffs and go straight to the purported injury.133 From
that point, the court’s inquiry is a function of the legislation. Australian
cases tend to focus on either (1) whether injury will occur to a specific area
or (2) whether required assessments have been properly conducted.
Litigation under the EPBC Act is more like a traditional claim in the
United States because the Act requires consideration of injury to protected
areas. The focus is on a specific environmental injury caused by climate
change, much like the way in which the traditional injury in the United
States focuses on concrete and particularized injury to the plaintiff or the
plaintiff’s interests, as in Massachusetts v. EPA.134 In contrast, litigation
under the EP&A Act is more akin to procedural-right claims because the
issue before the court is proper fulfillment of a statutory requirement, as
was the case in Watson. Additionally, under the EP&A Act, the injury is
the violation of procedural requirements mandated by law. This distinction
makes a difference because in Wildlife Whitsunday, a case under the EPBC
Act, the court could not link the Isaac Plains coal mine to environmental
harm to a protected matter, but in Gray, the court could determine that
there had been a procedural violation of the EP&A Act.
Ultimately, though their focuses and lines of inquiry differ, both U.S.
and Australian courts use existing legislation and doctrines to assess
climate change injuries.
Legislation implementing a procedural
requirement or a procedural right facilitates the court’s ability to adjudicate,
as in Gray and Watson, respectively. For claims based on tangible injury,
however, satisfying the standing requirement is a complicated task. For
instance, the plaintiff and the plaintiff’s ability to prove injury was an
essential component of litigation in Massachusetts v. EPA, especially since
the judges from the circuit court opinion debated what constituted injury.
The Australian courts engaged in a similar debate in Wildlife Whitsunday,
where the court had to evaluate what qualified as indirect impact.

132. Pearson, supra note 44, at 340–41.
133. None of the cases referenced in this paper discuss the plaintiffs per se.
134. Despite the other factors of Massachusetts v. EPA, the Court still analyzed injury in a more
traditional sense rather than as a procedural right violation. See supra Part II.B.1.a.
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Unfortunately, the complications involved in assessing climate change in
light of standing doctrine do not end with injury. Once courts determine
there is an injury, they face the potentially more daunting task of
establishing a causal link between the defendant’s actions and that injury.
2. Causation
While some actions or some actors emit more GHGs than others, these
emissions cumulatively cause climate change, which causes injuries. But,
given the existence of an indeterminate number of emitters, the
accumulation of GHGs in the atmosphere, and the lapse of time and
distance between emissions and harmful effects, “linking specific climate
injuries to specific causes” is difficult at best and sometimes impossible.135
For instance, a potential chain of proximate cause for climate change might
look like this:
(1) companies produce fuel, power, vehicles, etc.; (2) consumer use of
these items generates greenhouse gas emissions, which rise into the
atmosphere; (3) the emissions combine with other greenhouse gas
emissions to warm the Earth; (4) this warming causes sea levels to rise,
snowpack to melt, etc.; and (5) these effects cause damage to plaintiff’s
property.136

As a result of these factors, two major issues arise in relation to causation:
cumulative emissions and traceability.
First, climate change functions cumulatively. It only happens because
total GHG emissions have surpassed a safe and sustainable level. As such,
the overall mitigation achieved by one emitter or one nation setting
emission limits has an almost imperceptible effect. For example, if
Australia does not allow projects for coal mining to proceed and does not
export coal to Japan, then Japan will just acquire and burn coal from
another source and the climate change harms will still occur, regardless of
Australia’s state action.137 Adding to this complication, past and present
emissions not only have immediate impact but also have consequences that
may go unrealized for decades as GHGs continue to accumulate or sea
levels continue to rise and eliminate coastal lands. Consequently, the
cumulative nature of climate change tends to complicate and often derail
135. See Marilyn Averill, Climate Litigation: Ethical Implications and Societal Impacts, 85 DENV.
U. L. REV. 899, 910 (2008) (discussing some of the inherent challenges involved in adjudicating climate
change).
136. David A. Grossman, Tort-Based Climate Litigation, in ADJUDICATING CLIMATE CHANGE:
STATE, NATIONAL, AND INTERNATIONAL APPROACHES, supra note 13, at 193, 219.
137. McAllister, supra note 89, at 69.
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the plaintiffs’ claims.
Second, once these GHG emissions go up into the atmosphere where
they cumulatively cause climate change, the harmful effects are felt around
the world. But, since the atmosphere encompasses the globe, belonging to
all and yet none, it is nearly impossible to trace harmful levels of GHG
emissions to their sources or to determine which combinations of sources
caused a particular injury. It is also difficult to properly allocate liability
because the damage occurs beyond the boundaries of any one court’s
jurisdiction.
In the face of these considerations, the ability of local courts to
incorporate a global problem like climate change into the traditional
notions of causation is limited. Nevertheless, U.S. law requires, and
liability ultimately depends on, showing that the defendant or an
instrumentality in the defendant’s control caused the plaintiff’s injury.138 In
general, a plaintiff must show a “fairly traceable” causal connection.139 But
that does not mean the “traceability” must “rise to the level of proximate
causation.”140 Moreover, the United States is not unique in prescribing
certain standards for and theories of causation. As such, local courts have
to decide exactly how much of a causal link is required in climate change
claims.
a. Causation under Common Law Claims
In Native Village of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corporation, the Alaskan
Inupiat Eskimo village Kivalina claimed that global warming was causing
the sea ice protecting the Kivalina coast to thin, resulting in erosion and
destruction that ultimately rendered Kivalina uninhabitable.141 The village
brought a federal common law public nuisance claim against twenty-four
oil, energy, and utility companies, seeking damages for the cost of
relocation of the village.142 They sought to link the vast volume of GHGs
that these companies had emitted to Kivalina’s climate change injury.143
Establishing causation under standing doctrine, however, proved to be a
major point of contention.
For approaches to causation, the plaintiffs in Kivalina turned to prior

138. Averill, supra note 135, at 911.
139. Native Vill. of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 663 F. Supp. 2d 863, 877 (N.D. Cal. 2009)
(quoting Salmon Spawning & Recovery Alliance v. Gutierrez, 545 F.3d 1220, 1227 (9th Cir. 2008)).
140. Id. at 878 (quoting Habecker v. Town of Estes Park, Colo., 518 F.3d 1217, 1225 (10th Cir.
2008)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
141. Id. at 868.
142. Id.
143. Id.
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environmental and pollution cases, looking particularly at water pollution
cases. First, they argued that the “contribution approach” indicated the
proper degree of causation required.144 Under this causation theory, which
has been employed in water pollution cases, courts look at whether the
plaintiff can prove that (1) the defendant’s polluting source is the “seed of
[the plaintiff’s] injury” and (2) the defendant has not indemnified or
proposed an alternative offender.145 The court, however, disagreed with the
Kivalina plaintiffs. First, it pointed out that, while there are similarities
between water pollution and climate change, “[t]here is a critical distinction
between a statutory water pollution claim versus a common law nuisance
claim.”146 The statutory water pollution cases referenced by the plaintiffs
relied on the Clean Water Act.147 The Clean Water Act establishes the
presumption that discharge exceeding congressionally mandated limits
gives rise to a substantial likelihood that the defendant caused the
plaintiff’s harm, regardless of whether other parties made similar
discharges.148 There is no comparable federal standard limiting GHG
emissions, however, and no statutory presumption declaring that there is a
substantial likelihood that the defendant’s conduct caused the plaintiff’s
injury.149 Thus, without statutory limits and statutory presumptions, the
court could not apply the contribution approach, and it held that whether
the defendant contributed to the injury was irrelevant.150 Given the nature
of climate change, it makes sense that discharge alone or mere contribution
is insufficient to create a causal link. Otherwise, every emitter of GHGs
would be potentially liable.
Sua sponte, the court also briefly considered applying a “seed of
injury” analysis, under which the plaintiffs would have needed to prove the
emissions of the oil, energy, and utility companies were the source of their
climate change injury.151 Unfortunately, this method is also difficult to
apply to a global phenomenon like climate change. Given the plaintiffs’
concessions regarding “the undifferentiated nature of greenhouse gas
emissions from all global sources and their worldwide accumulation over
long periods of time,” the court acknowledged that “there [was] no realistic
144. Id. at 878.
145. Id. at 879 (quoting Tex. Indep. Producers and Royalty Owners Ass’n v. EPA, 410 F.3d 964,
974 (7th Cir. 2005)).
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 879–80.
150. Id. at 880.
151. See id. at 879 (quoting Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Gaston Copper Recycling Corp., 204 F.3d
149, 162 (4th Cir. 2000)) (describing the standard for a “seed of injury” claim).
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possibility of tracing any particular alleged effect of global warming to any
particular emissions by any specific person, entity, group at any particular
point in time.”152 When characterized in this manner, no matter how
egregious or substantial the defendant’s emissions, the plaintiffs simply
could not prove that the defendant’s conduct was the seed of their injury.153
Finally, the court considered whether the plaintiffs were within the
“zone of discharge” of the defendant, a test that had been used in several
pollution cases. For this approach, plaintiffs that are sufficiently in the
discharge zone of a polluter can argue that their injuries are fairly traceable
to that polluter’s actions.154 This method, however, is inapplicable for the
same reasons that the “seed of injury” analysis failed: the inherently global
nature of climate change prevents the plaintiffs from tracing the path of
particular GHG emissions.155 Acknowledging this complication, the
plaintiffs tried to argue that the geographical area for the zone of discharge
in global warming cases should be the entire world.156 The court dismissed
the argument because it “suggests that every inhabitant on this Earth is
within the zone of discharge, thereby effectively eliminating the issue of
geographic proximity in any case involving harms caused by global
warming.”157 While not necessarily relevant in the context of climate
change, geographic proximity would have been necessary to successfully
prove causation under the zone of discharge theory. Thus, while the
argument accurately characterizes climate change as a global problem, the
court’s reasoning suggests that the zone of discharge theory cannot
accommodate climate change.
In conclusion, the plaintiffs failed to assert causation, and thus the
plaintiffs’ claim for nuisance was ultimately barred for lack of standing.158
Kivalina demonstrates how existing doctrine can limit the court’s ability to
rule on the merits of climate change cases. While there are many available
theories of causation, not all of them can be adapted to accommodate
climate change. Many of the methods that the plaintiffs tried to use are not
applicable to and should not be used for climate change cases. For
example, the zone of discharge theory is not suited to a global problem due

152. Id. at 880.
153. Id. at 881.
154. See id. (quoting Tex. Indep. Producers and Royalty Owners Ass’n v. EPA, 410 F.3d 964, 973
(7th Cir. 2005)) (describing the “zone of discharge” standard).
155. Id. at 881.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 863, 868–83. While the claim was also barred under the political question doctrine, that
issue is beyond the scope of this paper.
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to its emphasis on geographical proximity. The contribution approach,
however, is not useful because limits and statutory presumptions do not
exist for climate change. Rather than suggesting courts cannot or should
not adjudicate climate change suits, Kivalina demonstrates the need for
judicially manageable standards by which to assess the causal link between
emissions and injuries. If there are no such standards, then courts simply
do not have the capacity or legitimacy to assess such claims.
b. Causation under Statutory Claims and Procedural Rights
Plaintiffs have had far more success proving causation under statutory
claims than under common law claims. This success is due in part to the
fact that when a plaintiff is proceeding under a procedural challenge, as in
Watson, and has already established injury, the “causation and
redressability standards are relaxed.”159 Specifically, to demonstrate
standing in a procedural rights case, the “plaintiff must show not only that
the defendant’s acts omitted some procedural requirement, but also that it is
substantially probable that the procedural breach will cause the essential
injury to the plaintiff’s own interest.”160 In Watson, the federal law in
question, NEPA, required that the defendants conduct environmental
assessments before giving support to certain projects.161 The statute also
granted local courts the ability to ensure that this requirement was
fulfilled.162 Given the plaintiffs’ reasoning that (1) the OPIC and Ex-Im
projects were directly or indirectly responsible for eight percent of the
world’s annual emissions, (2) continued increases in GHG emissions cause
global warming, resulting in widespread environmental impacts, and (3)
these impacts “have and will effect [sic] areas used and owned by
Plaintiffs,”163 the court concluded that the plaintiffs “sufficiently
The attenuated causal link between a
demonstrated causation.”164
significant percentage of world GHG emissions and the general impact on
areas that the plaintiffs owned and used by evidences the relaxed standards
159. Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Watson, No. C 02-4106 JSW, 2005 WL 2035596, at *3 (N.D.
Cal. Aug. 23, 2005) (citing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 572 n.7 (1992)).
160. Fla. Audubon Soc. v. Bentsen, 94 F.3d 658, 664–65 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
161. Id. at *1.
162. NEPA claims were also pursued in Center for Biological Diversity v. United States
Department of the Interior, 563 F.3d 466 (D.C. Cir. 2009), in which the petitioners argued that the
Department of the Interior’s approval of projects to expand leasing areas in the Outer Continental Shelf
for offshore oil and gas development violated the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (OCSLA), 43
U.S.C. §§ 1331–1356a (2006), and NEPA because the Department did not consider the effect on
climate change. Ctr. for Biological Diversity, 563 F.3d at 471. The NEPA claims were ultimately held
not ripe for adjudication. Id. at 472.
163. 2005 WL 2035596, at *3.
164. Id. at *4.
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under statutory claims.
Similarly, in Wildlife Whitsunday, the Australian court was concerned
with the environmental impacts the Minister is required to consider under
section 75 of the EPBC Act.165 The plaintiffs argued that “[c]onsideration
of the impacts of the action under section 75 of the EPBC Act must
consider the potential impacts of greenhouse gas emissions from the
burning of the coal on global warming and the consequential impacts on
matters of national environmental significance.”166 Declaring that an
impact is “the difference between the position if the action occurs and the
position if it does not,”167 the court concluded that the purpose of the EPBC
Act was “to prevent or minimize such adverse impacts” via the required
consideration under section 75.168 Here, the focus was on environmental
impacts resulting from the creation of the Isaac Plains mine.169 But,
beyond the vague (though accurate) notion that “greenhouse gas emission
is bad, and that the Australian government should do whatever it can to
stop it,” the plaintiffs could not establish a traceable causal link between
the project under consideration and potential adverse impacts on the
environment.170 Furthermore, the court found that the Minister had
fulfilled his statutory requirement to consider both the direct and indirect
impacts of the specific project: the Minister had analyzed the possible
direct impact on the Isaac River “as the result of pollution” and the indirect
impacts, “includ[ing] the issue of greenhouse gas emission and climate
change.”171 In other words, the Minister accounted for “the possibility that
greenhouse gas emission might cause climate change and consequential
effects upon protected matters.”172
Interestingly, the actual emissions from the Isaac Plains Coal Project
and the Sonoma Coal Project would have been responsible for GHG
emissions equivalent to 25% of Australia’s total GHG emissions in 2003.173
Yet, the court did not draw a causal connection between these projects and
adverse impacts. The court was limited in part by skepticism about its
ability to apply the indirect impact doctrine to GHG emissions. This

165. Wildlife Pres. Soc’y of Queensl. Proserpine/Whitsunday Branch Inc. v Minister for the En’t &
Heritage (Wildlife Whitsunday), (2006) 232 ALR 510, ¶ 8.
166. Id. ¶ 11.
167. Id. ¶ 55.
168. Id. ¶ 57.
169. Id. ¶ 9.
170. Id. ¶ 72.
171. Id. ¶ 22.
172. Id. ¶ 42.
173. McGrath, supra note 93, at 4.
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limitation suggests a deficiency in the EPBC Act, the indirect impacts
language of which does not accommodate climate change injuries.174 The
global nature of climate change and the injuries it causes also limited the
court. The global problem simply did not fit within the causation doctrine
the court had at its disposal.
The chain of causation was also a major point of contention in Gray.
In this case, the plaintiffs proceeded under the EP&A Act and claimed
noncompliance with the environmental assessment requirements therein, as
described in section 75.175 The plaintiffs argued that “it was common sense
to determine that there would be greenhouse impacts resulting from the
burning of the coal from the Anvil Hill Project which would contribute to
global warming/climate change and that therefore this impact should be
considered in the environmental assessment for the project.”176 But the
court found it “problematic” to apply a common sense approach, created
for establishing liability in private law matters, where the plaintiff’s injury
is in connection with the breach of a duty of care, to an appellate case on
environmental assessments under the EP&A Act.177 Since there were no
climate change cases in which such reasoning had been “applied in a
judicial review context” and since other cases had established “limitations
in relation to the application” of a common sense approach where it had
been applied, the court was simply not going to allow the doctrine to be
expanded and applied to climate change cases.178
In contrast to the method suggested by the plaintiffs, many prior
climate change cases had required Australian courts to analyze “what
impacts are sufficiently related to the proposed activity and therefore
necessary to be considered in environmental assessments.”179 These cases
had established the principle that impacts sufficiently connected to a
project, including off-site impacts resulting from third parties, ought to be
considered.180 Additionally, courts in these cases had held that where a
“‘real and sufficient link’ is demonstrated,” external environmental impacts
are relevant to the assessment of total environmental impact.181

174. See id. at 4–5 (proposing that the EPBC Act does not effectively regulate coal mine emissions
and that there is a need for a greenhouse gas trigger under the EPBC Act).
175. Gray v Minister for Planning [2006] NSWLEC 720 (Unreported, Pain J, Nov. 27, 2006), ¶
15.
176. Id. ¶ 83.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id. ¶ 84.
180. Id.
181. Id.
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Furthermore, a wider inquiry into impacts could be required to the extent
that significant effects are likely.182 Referring to this case law under the
EP&A Act, the court reiterated the duty to consider direct and indirect
effects,183 finding a sufficient link existed between the Anvil Hill Project,
climate change, and impacts on the environment. The court stated:
Given the quite appropriate recognition by the Director-General that
burning the thermal coal from the Anvil Hill Project will cause the
release of substantial GHG in the environment which will contribute to
climate change/global warming which, I surmise, is having and/or will
have impacts on the Australian and consequently NSW environment it
would appear that Bignold J’s test of causation based on a real and
sufficient link is met.184

Importantly, the court also discussed climate change and how it should
fit into existing doctrine:
Climate change/global warming is widely recognised as a significant
environmental impact to which there are many contributors worldwide
but the extent of the change is not yet certain and is a matter of dispute.
The fact there are many contributors globally does not mean the
contribution from a single large source such as the Anvil Hill Project in
the context of NSW should be ignored in the environmental assessment
process. The coal intended to be mined is clearly a potential major
single contributor to GHG emissions deriving from NSW given the large
size of the proposed mine. That the impact from burning the coal will be
experienced globally as well as in NSW, but in a way that is currently
not able to be accurately measured, does not suggest that the link to
causation of an environmental impact is insufficient.185

The court impeccably articulated the challenges of a global problem.
It addressed how cumulative emissions cause climate change and, much
like the Supreme Court in Massachusetts v. EPA, disaggregated the global
and cumulative nature of the problem from the ability to find causation
from a certain project or a certain injury. Ultimately holding the
assessment void,186 the local court, by following this line of reasoning and
by applying statutory and case law, was able to find causation, address a
global problem, and become a global actor.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.

Id. ¶ 88.
Id. ¶ 91.
Id. ¶ 97.
Id. ¶ 98.
Id. ¶ 152.
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c. Conclusions on Causation
As in the injury analysis, the cumulative nature of climate change and
the difficulty of tracing emissions to injuries frequently prevent courts from
finding causation under traditional standards. Under certain circumstances,
courts find a causal link, as in Massachusetts v. EPA. More often, plaintiffs
have success establishing causation under a statutory, as opposed to a
common law, claim. In the United States, traditional causation doctrine for
plaintiffs pursuing a common law claim is unfavorable for global problems
like climate change because it requires an impossibly close link between
emission sources and injuries. Even other environmental causation theories
are not applicable because other forms of pollution do not operate in the
same way that climate change does. As a result, courts simply cannot use
those doctrines. For instance, in Kivalina, the court could not consider the
merits of the case because the plaintiffs did not (or could not) adequately
trace the defendants’ GHG emissions to global warming and then to their
injury. Since they failed to demonstrate causation, they did not have
standing. If, however, there is a statute in place providing a procedural
right, then it is significantly easier to prove causation because the standards
are relaxed. This circumstance occurred in Watson, where the plaintiff’s
evidence on causation was sufficient, though not significantly more precise
than the seed of injury evidence considered sua sponte by the court in
Kivalina. These cases exemplify the essentialness of the relaxation of the
causation requirement because establishing a causal link between a
particular activity and a particular injury is inherently problematic in a suit
based on the global accumulation of GHGs.
Meanwhile, the Australian causation standard is significantly more
expansive than the U.S. standard because the impacts considered in
environmental assessments in Australia can be direct or indirect. This
direct or indirect impacts test is better suited to climate change because
GHG emissions, which cause environmental injuries only through the
global warming caused by their accumulation, inherently have an indirect
effect on protected matters. Nevertheless, Australian courts still face
challenges under the causation prong. The court in Wildlife Whitsunday
was unable to find causation under the EPBC Act due to its inability to fit
the nature of climate change into the existing indirect impact doctrine. The
court in Gray, however, not only established a causal link but also
explained how the EP&A Act assessment standards adequately
accommodated the unique problem of climate change. The court
demonstrated an acute understanding of the issue by acknowledging and
accepting uncertainties to a certain degree and then fitting climate change
into doctrine available under case law. This case also suggests that
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Australian legislation and, in turn, local environmental courts are
significantly more prepared to handle global problems like climate change.
Still, these successes and failures demonstrate that much will depend
on the circumstances of the case, the degree of causation required under
either common or statutory law, and how plaintiffs phrase their arguments.
Plaintiffs will be most successful at establishing causation when they
present evidence showing a more particular causal link than the general and
vague argument that emissions cause climate change and climate change
causes adverse effects. While this statement may be true, it does not help
courts trace the defendants’ actions to the injuries at issue. As seen in
Wildlife Whitsunday and Kivalina, however, it is not always possible to
provide such a precise link, and where such uncertainty is unacceptable,
courts will simply not have the capacity to address a global problem like
climate change.
3. Redressability
Once, and if, plaintiffs satisfy injury and causation standards, they
face another task: proving redress. They must show that the court is
functionally able to provide a remedy by requiring agency action, holding
agency action invalid,187 or, in the case of private defendants, awarding
damages.188 Essentially, the redressability prong concerns the court’s
ability to effect change. A single court judgment against a single defendant
will not solve climate change because other parties will continue to emit
GHGs. If this interpretation were the only one, then redressability would
be a permanent hurdle to adjudicating climate change. Therefore, courts
often consider redressability in light of administrative decisions under
statutes or mandates related to climate change. Shifting away from literal
redress, such as completely alleviating the plaintiff’s injury, towards
symbolic redress, such as requiring an agency to act in an appropriate way
or follow its mandate, enables courts to address climate change within the
bounds of their judicial and doctrinal capacity.
a. Redress against Administrative Agencies
In response to the redressability requirement for standing, in
Massachusetts v. EPA, the EPA contended that even if there were a

187. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561–62 (1992) (“[S]tanding depends
considerably upon whether the plaintiff is himself an object of the action (or forgone action) at issue. If
he is, there is ordinarily little question that the action or inaction has caused him injury, and that a
judgment preventing or requiring the action will redress it.”).
188. Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 127 (1998) (“When one private party is
injured by another, the injury can be redressed . . . by awarding compensatory damages . . . .”).
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traceable injury, it did not “believe that any realistic possibility exists that
the relief petitioners seek would mitigate global climate change and remedy
their injuries.”189 It argued that a local court decision requiring a national
administrative agency to set emission standards cannot solve climate
change because foreign countries may continue to emit at will, GHGs will
still accumulate in destructive amounts, and climate change will still result
in injuries.190 Therefore, the EPA concluded that the court is not a proper
forum for global problems like climate change because its actions cannot
significantly affect the global problem.191 The Court rejected the EPA’s
contention.192 In doing so, it shifted away from literal redress towards a
more nuanced form that is more appropriate for the judiciary and for a
global problem. It acknowledged legislative action does not “resolve
massive problems in one fell regulatory swoop.”193 It declared that the
EPA incorrectly relied on the assumption that “a small incremental step,
because it is incremental, can never be attacked in a federal judicial
forum.”194 This assumption is erroneous because federal courts still have
jurisdiction to “determine whether that step conforms to law”195 and can
provide redress by making such a determination. The Court set a standard:
if the “risk of catastrophic harm, though remote, is nevertheless real” and
“[t]hat risk would be reduced to some extent if petitioners received the
relief they seek,” then there is standing.196 The importance of this
determination in the context of climate change litigation cannot be
overstated. Essentially, the Court accepted the global nature of the issue
but declared that it can still adjudicate climate change and play a role in
solving the problem.
This conclusion means that given a combination of facts and
circumstances that satisfy standing requirements, local courts are viable
forums to address climate change. They can become global forums by
ruling on the actions that fall within their jurisdictional and judicial
capacity. For example, U.S. courts can address EPA actions and interpret
Congressional mandates197 whereas Australian courts can ensure

189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.

549 U.S. 497, 523 (2007).
Id. at 523–24.
Id. at 525.
Id. at 524–25.
Id. at 524.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 526.
Id. at 516.
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compliance with statutes such as the EPBC Act198 and the EP&A Act.199
So, while holding the EPA responsible for regulating motor-vehicle
emissions “will not by itself reverse global warming, it by no means
follows that [the Court] lack[s] jurisdiction to decide whether the EPA has
a duty to take steps to slow or reduce it.”200
Similarly, in Watson, since the plaintiffs sued under a procedural right
and successfully proved injury and causation, they only had to show that
the agency’s “decision could be influenced by the environmental
considerations that [the relevant public statute] requires an agency to
study” to satisfy the redressability prong.201 There, the court determined
that the OPIC and Ex-Im decisions could have been influenced by further
environmental studies required under NEPA. Since the plaintiffs were able
to prove injury, causation, and redressability and were challenging final
agency actions under a statute that did not specifically preclude judicial
review, they were able to bring their case before the courts.202 Thus, local
courts were a viable forum to rule on the merits of the claim and potentially
hold OPIC and Ex-Im liable for the global effects of their choices and
actions,203 even if that included projects condoned far from the local court’s
geographic jurisdiction.204 This case exemplifies the ways in which local
courts can ensure that agencies take climate change into account when
taking action under relevant legislation. It is also one indication that local
courts can compel action to address a global problem.
b. Redress in Response to Administrative Decisions
Some courts also possess the power to conduct judicial review in order
to provide redress for incorrectly performed environmental assessments.
As an example, in Gray, the plaintiffs claimed the Director-General did not
take the ESD principles—in particular, the precautionary principle and the
principle of intergenerational equity—into account when assessing the

198. Wildlife Pres. Soc’y of Queensl. Proserpine/Whitsunday Branch Inc. v Minister for the En’t &
Heritage (Wildlife Whitsunday), (2006) 232 ALR 510, ¶ 8.
199. Gray v Minister for Planning [2006] NSWLEC 720 (Unreported, Pain J, Nov. 27, 2006), ¶ 1.
200. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. at 525.
201. Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Watson, No. C 02-4106 JSW, 2005 WL 2035596, at *4 (N.D.
Cal. Aug. 23, 2005) (quoting Citizens for Better Forestry v. U.S. Dept. of Agric., 341 F.3d 961, 975
(9th Cir. 2003)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
202. Watson, 2005 WL 2035596, at *8.
203. See id. at *6 (discussing the plaintiff’s challenge of the actions of Ex-Im and OPIC).
204. Ex-Im and OPIC facilitate projects around the world. Who We Are, OVERSEAS PRIVATE INV.
CORP., http://www.opic.gov/who-we-are/overview (last visited Jan. 2, 2013); About Us, EXP.-IMP.
BANK OF THE U.S., http://www.exim.gov/about/ (last visited Jan. 2, 2013).
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environmental impact of the Anvil Hill Project.205 They argued that it was
therefore the court’s responsibility to determine whether the DirectorGeneral had complied with the legal requirements embodied in the EP&A
Act.206
First, the court had to assess what was required under the ESD
principles. The precautionary principle stands for the notion that “if there
are threats of serious or irreversible environmental damage, lack of full
scientific certainty should not be used as a reason for postponing measures
to prevent environmental degradation.”207 The intergenerational equity
principle provides that “the present generation should ensure that the
health, diversity, and productivity of the environment are maintained or
enhanced for the benefit of future generations.”208
When the
intergenerational equity principle is applied to an environmental
assessment, it is particularly important to analyze the “cumulative impacts
of proposed activities on the environment.”209 Since cumulative emissions
cause climate change, this principle is particularly applicable to climate
change cases. More importantly, it allows courts to apply a broad principle
that already exists in their doctrinal arsenal to reach a global problem.
In Gray, the court articulated that the existence of cumulative effects
does not preclude consideration of an environmental impact. Bearing the
precautionary principle in mind, the court reasoned that “failure to consider
cumulative impact will not adequately address the environmental impact of
a particular development where often no single event can be said to have
such a significant impact that it will irretrievably harm a particular
environment but cumulatively activities will harm the environment.”210
The court readily applied these principles to climate change and required
the Director-General to do so as well, holding that the difficulty of
“quantify[ing] an impact with precision” did not excuse the DirectorGeneral from assessing such impacts and taking into account the principles
he is legally required to consider.211
While acutely aware of its limited role and the need to avoid intruding
on an administrative decision, the court also knew it had the power and the
duty to hold administrative agencies accountable for failure to fulfill a legal

205.
101.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.

Gray v Minister for Planning [2006] NSWLEC 720 (Unreported, Pain J, Nov. 27, 2006), ¶
Id. ¶ 1.
Id. ¶ 101.
Id.
Id. ¶ 122.
Id.
Id. ¶ 138.
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requirement.212 Accordingly, the court exercised its discretion to grant
relief213 by holding the environmental assessment void.214 In doing so, the
court not only considered the detrimental impacts of climate change but
also ensured that those impacts would be considered in determining
whether a GHG-emitting mine can be operated. It provided redress to a
global problem.
c. Redress against Private Defendants
In contrast to decisions involving administrative agencies, redress for
private defendants has been largely unsuccessful. For example, when the
Alaskan Inupiat Eskimo village Kivalina filed a complaint against several
oil companies, power companies, and utility providers, alleging federal
common law public nuisance, state law private and public nuisance, civil
conspiracy, and concert of action,215 the court did not even address the
redressability prong of standing because the plaintiffs could not establish
causation.216 The problem was not only that the defendants were private
companies rather than agencies with congressional mandates or statutes to
enact, but also that the plaintiff was a private party with no special status.
As seen in the above-mentioned cases, without special status or a
procedural right, standing is more difficult to achieve. So, seeking to
replicate Massachusetts’ success in Massachusetts v. EPA, Kivalina sought
the special solicitude “generally afforded to sovereigns,”217 which would
have entitled them to special standing requirements.218
Unlike
Massachusetts, however, Kivalina was “not seeking to enforce any
procedural rights concerning an agency’s rulemaking authority.”219
Instead, Kivalina made a claim for damages against private entities.220 But
states only retain a procedural right to challenge federal agency actions
because they have surrendered certain sovereign prerogatives to the federal
government, which exercises those prerogatives through agency action
(here, by issuing a federal mandate to the EPA to set emission

212. Id. ¶ 126.
213. Id. ¶ 145.
214. Id. ¶ 152.
215. Native Vill. of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 663 F. Supp. 2d 863, 869 (N.D. Cal. 2009).
216. Id. at 877–82 (illustrating that the court’s discussion of Article III standing includes an
analysis of contribution to injury and various theories of causation but does not include redressability).
217. Id. at 882.
218. See id. (discussing the special situation of states and their entitlement to special solicitude in
the standing analysis).
219. Id.
220. Id.
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standards).221 Thus, while Massachusetts could bring a claim against a
federal administrative agency, Kivalina could not bring a claim against
private oil, power, and utility companies. Moreover, Kivalina could not
even invoke quasi-sovereign status to sue parens patriae because that
status is “predicated on the rights a State relinquishes to the federal
government when it ‘enters the Union’”222 and Kivalina is a village, not a
state. Consequently, this case also demonstrates that success in climate
change cases in the United States is predominantly limited to cases against
administrative agencies rather than private defendants.
In contrast, in the Nigerian case Gbemre v. Shell Petroleum
Development Co. Nigeria, private plaintiffs successfully brought a claim
against private defendants.223 Much as the people of Kivalina joined
together as a village to sue private oil, power, and utility companies,
members of a local community in the Niger Delta joined together as a class
and sued oil companies engaged in gas flaring in their community. Since
the plaintiffs were Nigerian citizens in a Nigerian forum, the court readily
concluded that the plaintiffs had standing224 and proceeded to address the
merits of their claims.
The plaintiffs claimed that the defendants’ gas flaring activities
seriously polluted the air,225 adversely affected climate change,226 and
caused injury to the health of the community.227 Since natural gas drilling
and gas flaring by foreign companies in Nigeria contribute more GHGs
than the rest of sub-Saharan Africa combined,228 the plaintiffs were not
exaggerating. They argued that this activity was a
violation of their fundamental rights to life (including healthy
environment) and dignity of human person guaranteed by sections 33(1)
and 34(1) of the Constitution of Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 and
reinforced by articles 4, 16 and 24 of the African Charter on Human and

221. Id.
222. Id. at 882 (quoting Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 519 (2007)).
223. (2005) AHRLR 151, ¶ [2](2), available at http://www1.chr.up.ac.za/images/files/
publications/ahrlr/ahrlr_2005.pdf.
224. Id. ¶ [5](1) (“[T]he applicants were properly granted leave to institute these proceedings in a
representative capacity for himself and for each and every member of the Iweherekan Community in
Delta State of Nigeria.”).
225. Id. ¶ [4](4).
226. Id. ¶ [4](7)(c).
227. Id. ¶ [4](4).
228. Amy Sinden, An Emerging Human Right to Security from Climate Change: The Case against
Gas Flaring in Nigeria, in ADJUDICATING CLIMATE CHANGE: STATE, NATIONAL, AND INTERNATIONAL
APPROACHES, supra note 13, at 173, 177. While the climate change effects are far-reaching and global
in nature, the harms are also acutely felt within Nigeria. Id.
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Peoples’ Rights (Ratification and Enforcement) Act, Cap A9, vol1, Laws
of the Federation of Nigeria, 2004.229

The rights constitutionally guaranteed by these documents include the
right to clean, poison- and pollution-free healthy environments.230 The
plaintiffs further claimed that the defendants’ failure “to carry out
environmental impact assessment[s] in the applicant’s community
concerning the effects of their gas flaring activities is a violation of section
2(2) of the Environmental Impact Assessment Act, Cap E12 vol. 6 Laws of
the Federation of Nigeria, 2004.”231 By using the climate change harms
resulting from the defendants’ gas flaring activities as the basis to invoke
their constitutional and human rights,232 the plaintiffs forced the court to
interpret the right to life to include protection from the harmful effects of
climate change.
Technically, the plaintiffs won their case. The court held that the
aforementioned constitutionally guaranteed rights “inevitably include[] the
rights to clean, poison-free, pollution-free healthy environment[s]”233 and
that the oil exploration and production activities of the defendants are a
“gross violation of [the] fundamental right to life . . . and dignity of human
person as enshrined in the Constitution.”234 The decision, however,
contains major deficiencies in its treatment of climate change. While the
court read the right to life to include environmental rights,235 it did not
determine the circumstances in which climate change harms constitute a
Based on the enormous
violation of that fundamental right.236
contributions that gas flaring makes to climate change and on climate
change’s harmful effects on populations, it is possible that “where plaintiffs

229. (2005) AHRLR, ¶ [2](2).
230. Id. ¶ [2](1).
231. Id. ¶ [2](3).
232. Sinden, supra note 228, at 179 (citing Motion Ex Parte under Section 46(1) of the
Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, Statement Pursuant to Order 1, Rule 2(3) of the
Fundamental Rights (Enforcement Procedure) Rules, and Verifying Affidavit Pursuant to Order 1 Rule
2(3) of the Fundamental Rights (Enforcement Procedure) Rules, Gbemre v. Shell Petroleum
Development Co., (2005) AHRLR 151 (Suit No. FHC/CS/B/153/2005), available at http://www.
climatelaw.org/cases/country/nigeria/gasflares/ (“Read the Plaintiff’s Pleadings”); see also Gbemre,
(2005) AHRLR, ¶ [4](7)(c) (“That burning of gas by flaring same in their community gives rise to the
following: . . . Contributes to adverse climate change as it emits carbon dioxide and methane which
causes warming of the environment, pollutes their food and water.”).
233. Id. ¶ [5](3).
234. Id. ¶ [5](4).
235. See id. (holding that continuing to flare gas, which causes adverse environmental effects and
contributes to global climate change, is a violation of the plaintiffs’ fundamental right to life).
236. Sinden, supra note 228, at 181.

KASSMAN MACRO CORRECTED FINAL CLEAN(DO NOT DELETE)

2013]

HOW LOCAL COURTS ADDRESS GLOBAL PROBLEMS

2/6/2014 3:04 PM

239

can show they will suffer some risk of death or personal injury from the
impacts of climate change, they may be able to claim a violation of the core
civil and political rights to life, dignity, and personal security.”237 This
formulation empowers local courts to use their doctrines on fundamental
rights to address a global issue when the local population suffers the
devastating effects of climate change. Theoretically, local courts could
force private defendants, one by one, in incremental steps, to stop or correct
a destructive behavior with global as well as local effects. Since not much
has happened in the wake of the Gbemre decision,238 it has yet to be seen if
other local courts will use this theory.
d. Conclusions on Redressability
The discussion of redressability reveals that local courts are well
aware that agency actions are not expected to cure problems in one fell
swoop. Actions required under statutes or mandates, such as setting
emission standards to slow or reduce global warming or considering certain
aspects of climate change in environmental assessments, are intended to
“whittle away at [problems] over time.”239 When plaintiffs bring claims
related to these statutes or mandates, local courts can redress agency
actions rather than climate change per se. These courts, particularly in
Australia and the United States, provide redress by holding agencies
accountable and ensuring that the agencies consider and react to climate
change as mandated by the executive or legislature.240 This makes local
courts indirect global actors because they use their judicial role to reach a
global problem.
Still, in the United States, it has yet to be seen how narrowly or
broadly courts will construe the seminal case Massachusetts v. EPA and
whether future plaintiffs will be able to present claims with sufficient
particularity to achieve standing. With its holding, the Court opened the
door for a specific set of cases, but since (1) the harms of climate change
affect the global population, not just individual plaintiffs; (2) not all
plaintiffs are states; and (3) not all injured parties can invoke a federal
statute or agency inaction, many climate change cases may remain
nonjusticiable. And, as a result, courts will not be able to provide redress.
Without the appropriate doctrinal tools to actually provide redress,
courts are functionally not the appropriate venue for climate change.
237. Id. at 186.
238. See id. at 181 (noting that the defendants still have not stopped flaring).
239. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 524 (2007).
240. The discussions of Massachusetts v. EPA and Gray v Minister of Planning attest to this
statement.
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Performing judicial review and holding that an agency did not fulfill legal
requirements is a normal role. Courts can interpret the law and then require
agencies to correct their conduct, as in Gray or Massachusetts v. EPA.
Courts, however, are neither equipped nor entitled to set standards
themselves or to determine that parties are liable without using judicially
manageable standards, which would be found in legislation and existing
doctrine. So while the inability to offer redress in cases like Kivalina is
unfortunate, courts are also not the appropriate forums for such cases. Still,
where courts retain the functionality, legitimacy, and capacity to provide
redress, they are particularly well suited to address a global problem like
climate change.
III. BECOMING PART OF THE SOLUTION
A. How Courts Address Global Problems
The above cases demonstrate that the global nature of the problem
does not seem to be changing the way courts tackle climate change. Local
courts use local legislation and local doctrines to address this global
problem. Plaintiffs still have to meet traditional standing requirements, and
courts must follow existing statutes, case law, principles, and doctrines.
Because these doctrines were developed for localized problems, localized
parties, and discrete jurisdictions, they do not always adapt easily to
accommodate a global problem like climate change. Standing, for
example, is intended to weed out issues that are not appropriate or not ripe
for adjudication. As a result, some climate change claims will not have
standing and courts will simply not be able to adjudicate.
This result, however, is neither a problem nor necessarily a “flaw in
the system” because “an inescapable result of any standing doctrine
application is that at least some disputes will not receive judicial
review.”241 Climate change, with its latent effects caused by cumulative
emissions, often does not fit nicely into the existing standing criteria. As a
result, many plaintiffs’ claims will fail before courts can even rule on the
merits. This was the case in Kivalina, where the plaintiffs could not prove
causation, and in Wildlife Whitsunday, where the court could not establish
injury despite the expansive direct and indirect effects test. In this way,
doctrine can impede climate change litigation by limiting courts to the rules
and standards available and applicable. Conversely, if the problem is
characterized in a way that fits into existing doctrine, then courts can
adjudicate. In Gray, the EP&A standards and ESD principles readily

241. Fla. Audubon Soc. v. Bentsen, 94 F.3d 658, 665 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
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accommodated climate change. In other circumstances, the existence of a
procedural right or special standing modifies the doctrine applied by the
courts into one that more easily accommodates global problems. This was
the case in Watson and Massachusetts v. EPA respectively. In sum, where
doctrine empowers courts, courts can address global problems like climate
change.
B. The Institutional Role of Courts
1. Jurisdictional Authority
Even when local courts do possess the jurisdictional authority and
willingness to address climate change, it is debatable whether a global
problem like climate change ought to be subject to judicial review. Courts
have a limited institutional capacity, but in many cases they are well suited
to address global problems. First, courts place checks on the legislative
and executive branches and can serve as a means of accountability for
administrative agencies.242 Therefore, if legislation requires an agency to
take action on climate change, such as the federal mandate to the EPA to
set emission standards or the EP&A Act requirement that DirectorGenerals consider climate change in environmental assessments, then
courts can apply judicial reasoning to assess the situation. After evaluating
the legal requirements, courts can hold agencies accountable. They can
oblige the EPA to create emission standards or require environmental
assessments to include climate change.
While they are responding to local plaintiffs and national actors, at the
core, local courts are addressing a global problem. The courts are not
setting emission standards or coordinating efforts across national
boundaries, but they are requiring action to be taken in solving a global
problem. Like agencies that are required to “whittle away at [massive
problems] over time, refining their preferred approach as circumstances
change and as they develop a more-nuanced understanding of how best to
proceed,”243 courts can address climate change little by little, according to
the scope provided by existing doctrines, particularly standing doctrine.
2. Courts as an Appropriate Forum for Climate Change
As local courts confront climate change, the question remains how,
242. See FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 513 (2009) (“The Administrative
Procedure Act . . . sets forth the full extent of judicial authority to review executive agency action for
procedural correctness.” (citation omitted)); see also United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632,
644 (1950) (“The Administrative Procedure Act was framed against a background of rapid expansion of
the administrative process as a check upon administrators.”).
243. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. at 524.
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can, and should they be making decisions, taking action, and delegating
responsibility and liability. In this era of globalization, courts are
responding to international, cross-border, and global problems, and they are
not allowing the transnational nature of these problems to frustrate their
ability to act.244 This willingness and ability to address global concerns
indicates the increasingly global role of local courts. Yet even if courts are
willing and able, three main issues arise: functionality, legitimacy, and
capacity.
a. Functionality
The first consideration is why local courts, rather than supranational
institutions, political branches, and global markets, are suited to tackle
global problems.245 In the case of climate change, no single institution
possesses the authority to regulate the atmosphere, and there is no world
court with superior jurisdiction. Most importantly, climate change is a
global phenomenon. As GHGs are a substance “fairly consistent in
concentration throughout the world’s atmosphere,”246 climate change
cannot be localized. Emissions may occur in a particular locale, but
climate change does not have local origins. Harm is only caused by
accumulation of increasing levels of GHGs in the atmosphere. Further, the
impact of climate change may be felt locally, particularly in coastal
areas,247 but simply addressing local components will not solve the
problem. For example, in the Gbemre case, emissions and injury occurred
in the same locale as the one in which the court was located. That court’s
decision, however, has no effect on emissions from Australian coal mines,
and those emissions also contribute to climate change and therefore to the
harms felt in Nigeria. Ultimately, the effects of climate change are felt in
different ways and to differing degrees in different locales both near and
far248 from major sources of emissions.
Local courts have functional advantages in addressing such a global
problem.249 First, local courts are established fora with existing laws and

244. See generally WILLIAM J. ACEVES, THE ANATOMY OF TORTURE: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY
FILÁRTIGA V. PEÑA IRALA 168 (2007) (“‘[D]omestic courts are increasingly less content . . . to allow
national boundaries to frustrate the efficacy of the civil justice process’ [in tort litigation].”).
245. See Michaels, supra note 9, at 5 (discussing U.S. courts in the role of world courts).
246. Control of Emissions from New Highway Vehicles and Engines, 68 Fed. Reg. 52,922, 52,927
(Sept. 8, 2003) (emphasis added).
247. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, and Native Village of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp.,
663 F. Supp. 2d 863, 878 (N.D. Cal. 2009), are examples of cases based on injury to coastal areas.
248. In Kivalina the village is in northern Alaska, whereas ExxonMobil and other oil, energy, and
utility companies emit GHGs all over the world, not only in close proximity to Kivalina.
249. See Michaels, supra note 9, at 19 (discussing the functional advantages of U.S. courts).
OF
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developed doctrine. When those laws pertain to climate change, courts can
use their doctrines to address and mitigate the problem. For instance, the
Australian Land and Environment Court possesses the expertise and
jurisdiction to adjudicate matters under environmental laws, such as the
EP&A Act, which address climate change. In Gray, the court did just that
and successfully addressed climate change by requiring the DirectorGeneral to take into account environmental impacts and ESD principles in
his assessment of the Anvil Hill Project.250 Second, local courts have the
institutional ability to ensure compliance with their decisions in ways that
international courts would not. For instance, after Massachusetts v. EPA,
the United States Circuit Court for the District of Columbia upheld
emissions standards set by the EPA.251 Third, local courts are readily
accessible to scores of plaintiffs, and the parties will often be familiar with
their own legal system.252 As an example, Nigerian plaintiffs brought suit
in Nigerian courts against multinational corporations in the Gbemre case.
b. Legitimacy
Despite these functional advantages, local courts apply local laws and
doctrines within the local system to a problem that cannot be localized.
Moreover, while these local courts are only locally accountable, their
actions may have impacts beyond their jurisdictions. Thus, courts also run
the risk of interfering with foreign affairs. This situation raises both
internal and external concerns about legitimacy.
Internally, states may frown upon local courts addressing non-local
problems due to the dubious boundary between cases suited for
adjudication and cases to be handled under the foreign relations power.253
Because foreign relations are political affairs under the jurisdiction of the
executive branch, courts must defer internally on these matters.254 Courts
often discuss these issues when they consider whether the case presents a

250. See Gray v Minister for Planning [2006] NSWLEC 720 (Unreported, Pain J, Nov. 27, 2006),
¶¶ 146, 152 (holding that the assessment was void, which meant that the Director-General had to make
a new assessment in compliance with the legal requirements).
251. See Matthew L. Wald, Court Backs E.P.A. over Emissions Limits Intended to Reduce Global
Warming, N.Y. TIMES, June 26, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/27/science/earth/epaemissions-rules-backed-by-court.html (discussing EPA findings and related rules setting limits on GHG
emissions in the wake of Massachusetts v. EPA).
252. See Michaels, supra note 9, at 19–20 (providing the groundwork for these statements by
comparing domestic U.S. courts to international courts).
253. Id. at 3 (describing how the U.S. administration has asked courts to dismiss international
cases because they disturb foreign relations).
254. See RICHARD A. FALK, THE ROLE OF DOMESTIC COURTS IN THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL
ORDER 9 (1964) (discussing the internal function of deference to transfer disputes to the foreign office).
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nonjusticiable political question, as in Kivalina.255 If it does, then courts
cannot adjudicate.256 This transfer of responsibility from courts to
executives, however, is only appropriate in certain cases where the
executive has superior means to address the issue. For example, “the
executive has a flexibility in the negotiating context that enables
consideration of special circumstances, whereas the judiciary is confined
by craft and by tradition to a narrow definition of the legal problem.”257
While this may be true, when the judiciary is within its proper bounds there
is no reason why it cannot adjudicate the problem rather than deferring it.
For instance, the U.S. Supreme Court readily affirmed that it had the right
to adjudicate in Massachusetts v. EPA because “[the] case suffers from
none of the[] defects” that would have precluded it from being considered a
justiciable controversy under Article III.258 Additionally, “[t]he parties’
dispute turns on the proper construction of a congressional statute, a
question eminently suitable to resolution in federal court.”259 When this is
the case, courts are legitimate forums vis-à-vis other domestic institutions.
Externally, if foreign entities disagree with the laws, doctrines, or
legal systems of local courts, they may oppose adjudication in those
forums. For instance, while the United States technically owes deference
to foreign nations by way of international comity,260 U.S. courts have
replaced international law with domestic law when serving as global
appeals courts for matters of human rights. Nations who oppose the U.S.
system or relevant U.S. laws but feel the effects of the ruling may oppose
the role taken by U.S. courts.261
Yet, to the extent that existing doctrines are applicable, there is no real
reason courts should not use the doctrinal tools at their disposal to address
climate change. If the legislature has enacted a statute related to climate
change, then courts can interpret that statute, as in Massachusetts v. EPA.
If the statute or regulation has created a procedural right, then courts can

255. See supra note 158.
256. Native Vill. of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 663 F. Supp. 2d 863, 871 (N.D. Cal. 2009)
(citing Corrie v. Caterpillar, Inc., 503 F.3d 974, 980 (9th Cir. 2007)).
257. FALK, supra note 254, at 9.
258. 549 U.S. 497, 516 (2007).
259. Id.
260. See FALK, supra note 254, at 9 (discussing deference in external relations). This deference
preserves the special character of international law and its place in a global system marked by
“jurisdictional rules for a social system that is both decentralized and divided.” Id.
261. See Michaels, supra note 9, at 2–3 (explaining that Europeans reject the tendency of U.S.
courts to hear claims by foreign parties based on foreign events and yet apply U.S. law, specifically in
the context of human rights).
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adjudicate claims brought by particular plaintiffs,262 as was the
circumstance in Watson. Finally, if the legislative or executive body has
mandated that an administrative agency create regulations related to
climate change, as the Court held in Massachusetts v. EPA, then, assuming
the regulation does not preclude judicial review, courts can ensure that
agencies are held accountable for their final decisions.263 When these
situations occur, local courts can use existing judicial doctrine to assess
claims instead of deferring to other institutions. They retain legitimacy by
remaining within their doctrinal and judicial bounds, while taking part in
solving a global problem.
c. Capacity
Within these bounds, local courts have the capacity to address global
problems. One local court ruling on one local land use case may have
minimal impact on overall GHG emissions, but, cumulatively, local courts
ruling on statutes pertaining to local environmental impact and forcing
local agencies to properly perform environmental assessments has a
“substantial impact on greenhouse gas production.”264 In these local cases,
courts use the doctrines at their disposal to reach the global problem. Since
the doctrines that local courts use developed in response to traditional
localized problems—involving localized parties and discrete
jurisdictions—they do not always accommodate global problems like
climate change.
Kivalina demonstrates that traditional standing
requirements make it nearly impossible to establish causation because the
available theories do not accommodate the cumulative nature of climate
change.
In the face of globalization, courts could transform such doctrines by
expanding their application to accommodate climate change. For instance,
the courts in Massachusetts v. EPA struggled with how to define injury in
the context of climate change until the Supreme Court disaggregated the
global nature of climate change from the particular injuries that result.265
Alternatively, courts could accept limitations under existing doctrine as
appropriate. The Australian court in Wildlife Whitsunday could not link
262. See Fla. Audubon Soc. v. Bentsen, 94 F.3d 658, 664 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (discussing standing in
procedural rights cases).
263. See Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Watson, No. C 02-4106 JSW, 2005 WL 2035596, at *4 (N.D.
Cal. Aug. 23, 2005) (quoting Lujan v. Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n, 497 U.S. 871, 882 (1990)) (explaining the
requirement that plaintiffs only challenge final agency action so that courts do not pervasively monitor
the day-to-day decisions of administrative agencies).
264. Trisolini & Zasloff, supra note 30, at 73.
265. See 549 U.S. 497, 522 (2007) (explaining that Massachusetts had a concrete injury despite the
fact that the harms of climate change are widely shared).
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coal mine emissions of GHGs to environmental injury to a protected matter
under the direct and indirect effects test. Following a different approach,
there could be a call for new, more adequate legislation. For example, the
EP&A Act and the accompanying ESD principles from Gray are
significantly more suited to the global phenomenon of climate change. No
matter the approach, applicable doctrines define limits, creating an arena in
which local courts have the capacity to address climate change and become
part of the solution to the global problem.
CONCLUSION
The most successful climate change litigation to date involves
requirements under climate change legislation. Since one of the essential
roles of courts is interpretation of statutes or applicable standards under
such statutes, courts are appropriate forums in these cases. Functionally,
they have doctrines for judicial analysis, possess compliance mechanisms,
and are accessible to litigants. When courts stay within their established
judicial role, they owe no internal or external deference and thus possess
legitimacy. Finally, the existence of applicable doctrine and judicially
manageable standards also gives them the capacity to handle the claims.
Still, the courts’ ability to adjudicate is based on plaintiffs having
standing to bring a suit in court. In the United States, standing requires
injury, causation, and redressability. Given the conceptual difficulty of
applying climate change to this construct, cases in which the plaintiff has
had some special status or procedural right and that have involved an
administrative institution rather than a private defendant have been the
most successful. States, for example, can sue parens patriae, as in
Massachusetts v. EPA. Similarly, plaintiffs suing under a procedural right
have relaxed causation and redressability standards, as in Watson. Notably,
these cases, as well as the Australian cases discussed, involve courts ruling
on or against administrative agencies and their decisions, rather than
private defendants. The key factors for success include relaxed standards
that enable courts to more easily fit climate change into existing doctrine
and a court’s inherent ability to hear and solve legal questions, such as
through statutory interpretation or judicial review of administrative
decisions. When those powers coincide with a global problem like climate
change, courts are prepared to adjudicate.
Without these special
circumstances, however, many claims fail on injury, causation, or
redressability, as in Kivalina.
Local courts are limited not by the global nature of the problems but
by the way in which a discrete case fits into existing doctrine and
established judicial limits. Thus, to the extent there are relevant
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regulations, enforceable mandates, or applicable doctrines, courts can
address global climate change. Consequently, doctrine enables local courts
to address global problems and to be catalysts for solving climate change.

